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THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORK FOR EXPORTS: THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
John H. Jackson*
I have been asked to talk to you this morning about the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)' and the international
regulatory framework as they focus on exports. Ten or fifteen years
ago when someone said "GATT", the response was often a puzzled
"What's that?" It was a relatively unknown organization at that
time, and arguably it was not an organization at all. A legal quarrel
arose during the late 1940's and early 1950's as to whether the
GATT was an organization, and there was also dispute over
whether the GATT has a binding international obligation on the
United States. Now, as to both of those questions, I answer firmly
"yes." GATT is an international organization regardless of what
definition is used, and it is also a binding international legal
obligation.2
Regardless of some of its constitutional infirmities, which I will
touch on in a minute, GATT is a central part of Western interna-
tional trading policy, at least in market economy societies. United
States Government officials, for example, constantly reiterate the
necessity of following GATT. Ambassador William Brock, the cur-
rent Special Trade Representative, has said explicitly in testimony
before Congress that the United States Government will refrain
from taking any action which is a violation of GATT.3 It is an ex-
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' The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. parts V, VI, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. The full
text of the most recent version of GATT is found in 4 CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GEN-
ERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE BASIC INSTRdMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
(1969) [hereinafter cited as GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS]. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS is sup-
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' The American courts, for example, have recognized GATT as binding United States law.
See, e.g., Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Ct., 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 819-20, 25
Cal. Rptr. 798, 809 (1962); Territory v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565, 568 (1957).
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plicit statement that goes quite far indeed; in fact when I first read
it I was a bit surprised at how far it actually goes, because I am not
sure that any major country in the world is truly prepared to make
such a statement about almost any legal obligation. Nevertheless,
there must be reasons behind Ambassador Brock's statement.
If any of you has had a chance to look into the work of some of
the congressional committees in the last two years, you will notice
that the House Ways and Means Committee is studying a bill on
international trade sometimes called the Gibbons Bill, named for
Congressman Gibbons from Florida who chaired the subcommit-
tee.4 The Gibbons Bill has been reported to the main Committee of
Ways and Means with a number of measures concerning interna-
tional trade regulation, many of those touching on GATT. One of
the firm principles enunciated by the subcommittee in its drafting
of that bill is that it would not put anything in the bill that was a
violation of GATT.'
Now, in fact, I do not think the subcommittee has succeeded in
carrying out its stated principle, for provisions in the bill are at
least questionably contrary to GATT. It is interesting, however,
that a committee of Congress seems so diligent in recognizing the
importance of GATT to United States policy. Even in the case of
domestic content legislation, a bill that has passed the House and
remains poised to go to the Senate which would restrict the im-
ports of automobiles into the United States' reflects an effort by
the committees involved to square the legislation with GATT.7 Al-
though I think they have failed, it is nevertheless interesting that
they have made the effort to try to develop legal arguments by
which they can reconcile their measures with GATT.
Now, however, one can ask whether this talk of compliance is a
mere smokescreen. I think there is considerable cause for concern
about whether the United States and other governments are in fact
living up to their GATT obligations. There are two levels, of
course, on which to look at this issue. One is the realization that we
never achieve total compliance. One can watch the activity at any
stop sign on almost any corner of the streets in the United States
' H.R. 4784, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
6 H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
' H.R. 1234, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For a comment on the interaction between do-
mestic content legislation and GATT, see Note, Domestic Content Requirements: A Legal
and Economic Analysis of Proposed U.S. Legislation and Foreign Content Laws, 17 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 407, 429-32 (1983).
H.R. REP. No. 287, Part I, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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and recognize that the law is not one hundred percent obeyed. So
perfect compliance is not truly the issue. The true issue is more a
question of relative compliance, of relative effectiveness. Perhaps
the core issue is whether the effectiveness is sufficient to make the
law functionally worthwhile. Relative compliance, however, is a
talk for another day.
GATT is central both to United States policy and to the policy
of other nations because of its elements of protection and predict-
ability. If you are representing exporters, and you are interested in
exporting to other parts of the world, to a very large degree the
slim, perhaps paper-thin wall between you and potential disaster
or bankruptcy after great efforts of developing the export market
may indeed be this frail instrument called GATT. Let us take a
rather concrete situation put in somewhat hypothetical but actu-
ally realistic terms. Suppose an exporter wants to develop a market
and sends goods to either a Latin American country like Brazil, a
European country like Germany or France, or an Asian country,
like Taiwan, Singapore, or Japan. Your client, the exporter, goes
out and develops that market. That takes a certain amount of cap-
ital. It takes work. It takes effort. It takes building relationships. It
may take advertising. It may take warranty applications. It may
even take construction of some local assembly plants and ware-
housing. It does not usually come free. All of that effort is ex-
pended and over a period of several years exports flourish, so that
the exporter begins to develop a good market with growing profit-
ability. Suppose that at such a moment the government in the
market suddenly changes as a result of an election, a coup, or what
have you. Suppose the new government notices that your business
venture can serve as a profitable area for domestic businessmen
who supported their election and, therefore, simply cuts off the im-
ports. The next day your client is wiped out.
Now, there is little between you and your exporter client and
that scenario for disaster; but, GATT is one thing that is there.
GATT is an instrument designed to prevent arbitrary government
action of just the type I have mentioned, and I think it has suc-
ceeded. The judgment of not only myself, but many others, is that
in fact it has succeeded remarkably well, not perfectly, but remark-
ably well, given the stresses and strains during the last thirty or
forty years of its existence. In fact, the success of GATT is such
that many of our problems of international economic policy today
are products of the enormous increase in trade that has occurred
during that thirty to forty year period. We talk increasingly about
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international global economic interdependence without acknowl-
edging that the major thing that has led to that interdependence is
the freeing, or liberalization, of trade flows by GATT. Other things
have led to this freeing; I do not mean to give all the credit to
GATT. Indeed, certain technological changes in communication
and transportation have played a primary role, but GATT and
other legal instruments surrounding it have been at the core of this
growth in international interdependence. Whatever little degree of
predictability and stability there is today in world commerce has
to be credited to this somewhat imperfect, but nevertheless quite
effective, system that we call GATT.
I would like to talk to you about three subjects today, trying to
respond to the questions that were asked of me when I was asked
to speak. First, I shall discuss a bit about GATT itself in an over-
view which in turn will be in three subdivided parts that I shall
mention. Second, I want to turn to what is perhaps the most burn-
ing issue of international trade today, the question of rules and
regulations relating to so-called unfair trade. Finally, I want to
deal briefly with the question of the effectiveness of GATT in
terms of its provisions for dispute settlement, implementation, and
other such issues. First, let us look briefly at the background of
GATT in the international setting of which it is a part. Then I
shall turn my discussion to the rules of the GATT that relate to
exports. Finally, for a reason I shall mention, I shall turn to
imports.
GATT was one of the immediate post-World War II efforts to
try to reform the international economic system because of the
feeling, at least partly, that the war itself resulted from the failure
of international economic institutions in the inter-war period. The
consequence of national government regulation, of stringent con-
trols, of the 1930 United States Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act,' of the
manipulation of exchange rates, of the development of quota re-
striction on trade by a number of countries in the world, and of
consequential development of certain preferential arrangements in
the commonwealth countries was a tightening, a restriction, of in-
ternational trade. Some blame for the great depression must be
laid on those actions.
Consequently, during World War II leaders of the United States
and other nations began developing thoughts about institutions
S Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
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that would be needed in the post-war period. Basically, their eco-
nomic thoughts went along two lines. One line of thought, concen-
trating on monetary reform, led to the International Monetary
Fund, the articles of which were negotiated in 1944 at the Bretton-
Woods Conference.' The second line concentrated on trade, and
there were two subsets of thought in that area. One subset was the
notion that there needed to be an international trade organization,
some kind of international organization that would be a counter-
part to the monetary organization, because money and trade were
really two sides of the same coin. Second, the thinking continued,
there had been a program in existence in the United States since
1934 called the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program,'0 for which
Secretary of State Cordell Hull had obtained the approval of Con-
gress in 1934. This program allowed the President and his repre-
sentatives to negotiate trade agreements for the reduction of trade
barriers. It had been reasonably successful, resulting in about
thirty-two bilateral agreements up to the period of World War II,
and this second subset of thought reflected the intent to pursue
that effort and carry it out even further.1
These two ideas, one for organization and the other for continu-
ing the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, merged into an ef-
fort that began in 1946 at a conference in London at which the
draft charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) was
completed. During these conferences not only was a charter
drafted, but there was a multilateral reciprocal trade agreement
which was also drawn up. This effort was GATT."2
The idea behind GATT was that there would be ITO to exist as
an organizational structure. GATT would merely be a subsidiary
agreement, one among many which the participants hoped would
be attached to the deal. The institutional backup and support for
such an agreement would be ITO. The problem was that ITO
never came into being, for although its charter was completed in
' Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and Articles of Agreement of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401,
T.I.A.S. Nos. 2501, 2502, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
'0 Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930, pt. III, Pub. L. No. 316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). For a
review of the workings of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, see Jackson, The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 249,
254-74 (1967) [hereinafter cited as GATT in Domestic Law].
" See J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 29, 396
(1977) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL PROBLEMS].
" See supra note 1.
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1948, the charter was never approved by the United States Con-
gress. In the early 1950's the executive branch finally announced
that it was dropping the ratification effort, and ITO was as a result
dead."3 No other country was prepared to enter ITO unless the
United States did, because in the immediate post-World War II
period the United States had all the bargaining chips. That failure
left us with GATT alone.
GATT was finally, negotiated at Geneva in 1947. Its drafting was
completed in October of 1947. There was a notion that it should be
implemented immediately, partly because it was drafted from the
point of view of the United States as an executive agreement under
the authority of the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act, which would expire in 1948. The executive branch desired to
bring GATT into force while that Act still existed so that, from the
United States point of view, the agreement could be implemented
without further references to Congress. That expedited implemen-
tation is almost what happened. 14
Interestingly enough, and many people are surprised when they
hear this fact, the GATT itself has never come into force. What
came into force was something called the Protocol for Provisional
Application," which was signed in October of 1947 to bring the
GATT provisionally into force, pending the bringing into force of
ITO. The idea behind provisional approval was that when ITO be-
came a full-fledged organization the GATT would then definitely
be put into force, perhaps with some modifications to make it con-
sistent with the ITO. The ITO-GATT relationship never material-
ized, so instead the Protocol itself implemented GATT. Techni-
cally and legally, as a matter of international law and as a matter
of United States domestic law, almost all of the text of GATT is
implementable domestic United States law invocable in courts. In-
deed, GATT has been invoked in courts in the United States, and
every court decision so far in those cases over three decades has
upheld the validity of GATT as an obligation of the United States
and as domestic law in those various circumstances.'"
" The aborted effort to create the ITO is discussed in LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at
396-99. See also J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 42-53 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as WORLD TRADE].
' See WORLD TRADE, supra note 13, at 42-53.
" Protocol of'Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. V, VI, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter cited as
Provisional Protocol].
"S See supra note 2. See also GATT in Domestic Law, supra note 10, at 280-92.
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Well, there we have it. That is GATT, an agreement with basi-
cally no constitutional underpinnings and ostensibly without an or-
ganization. There is sort of a minimal organizational framework in
GATT itself, which provides for the Contracting Parties to meet
for the introduction of new members into GATT and for voting on
certain matters such as waivers. Originally there were about
twenty-two signatory countries to GATT, but now about ninety
countries have signed.17 The original countries were basically de-
veloped Western market economies, but today well over two-thirds
of the membership of GATT is made up of developing countries.
This shift has dramatically changed some of the debate in GATT.
One can point to at least two problems with GATT as it was
initially structured. One is that the Protocol of Provisional Appli-
cation gave rise to something called grandfather rights, which
granted certain exceptions to countries for legislation that was in
effect before GATT came into force. 18 The other problem has
arisen from the institutional structure of GATT. The mechanisms
that are normally associated with an international organization
were largely absent, since GATT was not designed as an organiza-
tion, so they had to be developed within GATT as a matter of
practice, as a matter of informal accommodation.
In the last thirty or forty years the GATT has sponsored a series
of negotiating rounds, seven so far. During these negotiating
rounds countries have tried to develop further consensus and obli-
gation for the reduction of trade barriers. During the first five of
those rounds, which lasted through 1960-61, the emphasis of the
parties was on tariffs, which they to a great extent dismantled. In
the two subsequent rounds, the Kennedy Round in the early part
of the 1960's and the Tokyo Round in the last half of the 1970's,
we have seen a further dismantling of tariffs. In fact, many econo-
mists have commented that tariffs are largely inconsequential to-
day. The average tariff level after the full implementation of the
Tokyo Round will be in the neighborhood of four percent for the
major industrial Western market economy. Four percent is, as
some call it, merely a nuisance tax. It is not something that really
inhibits trade.
So the first five, and to a large extent even all of the seven
" For a list of the countries which are members, see LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 11, at
410 n.3.
" See Provisional Protocol, supra note 15, at art. I(b). For a discussion of the effects of
this "grandfather clause," see GATT in Domestic Law, supra note 10, at 294-97.
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rounds, have focused on tariffs. Beginning with the Kennedy
Round, however, two new approaches arose. One approach was to
try to develop a system of linear negotiating tariffs, that is, to have
a negotiated commitment to reduce tariffs by a certain percentage
amount across the board. The Kennedy Round introduced that
concept because the complexity of item-by-item tariff negotiations
was becoming too great, and the new approach was needed if any
further progress was going to be made. In the end, progress was
made. Estimates suggest that the Kennedy Round resulted in
something like a thirty percent to thirty-five percent overall aver-
age cut in tariffs, a substantial achievement.'9
The second approach of the Kennedy Round was to look at non-
tariff barriers. These restrictions were becoming increasingly criti-
cal, and today I think we can state unequivocally that they are the
most important problem for world trade, exports or imports. The
Kennedy Round tried to look at the problem, but it achieved only
some modest success in the question of antidumping duties and
little else.
With the Tokyo Round launched in 1973 by the GATT ministe-
rial meeting in Tokyo, attention was focused principally on non-
tariff barriers. Although tariffs were an important part of that ne-
gotiation, the objective was to negotiate the elaboration of a con-
siderable number of rules relating to non-tariff barriers. That goal
was accomplished, for many agreements have resulted from the
Tokyo Round.2 0 I have also talked about the new GATT-MTN sys-
tem created during the Tokyo meeting in an article written several
years ago, in which I contend it amounted to basically a new con-
"' Jackson, Louis, and Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of
Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REv. 267, 271 (1982).
1o The list of agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round includes: the Geneva (1979)
Protocol (tariff reduction); Protocol Supplementary to the Geneva (1979) Protocol; the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; the Agreement on Government Procurement;
the Agreement on Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (concerning subsidies and countervailing duties); the Arrangement Re-
garding Bovine Meat; the International Dairy Arrangement; the Agreement on Implementa-
tion of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (customs valuation);
Protocol to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII; the Agreement on Import Li-
censing Procedures; the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; the Agreement on the Imple-
mentation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (antidumping); the
Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participa-
tion in Developing Countries; and the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance. All of these agreements are collected at GATT, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 1, at 3-189, 203-04, 210-18 (Supp. 26 1978-79).
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stitutional system.'
I think it would be fair to estimate that the result of the Tokyo
Round is something like a quadrupling of the jurisdiction and ef-
forts and activity of the GATT. Certainly the governments are ex-
periencing the need for more staff to handle GATT matters. In
addition, the secretariat, a tiny secretariat by the standards of
most organizations, is experiencing needs also, and there are con-
siderably more meetings.
A number of these Tokyo Round agreements completed in 1979
are not terribly well known. The most prominent agreement is the
one that is turning out to be the least effective: the one dealing
with subsidies and countervailing duties.2 In addition, however,
agreements exist on valuating techniques for customs purposes and
on licensing procedures. Licensing, incidentally, is largely prohib-
ited by the GATT, but the negotiators were pragmatists. They
have provided that if you are going to sin you should at least sin in
a particular way. The negotiators also designed an agreement that
is supposed to govern these sins, and of course there are some
GATT exceptions that allow certain licensing and quota proce-
dures. In addition to these rules, the Tokyo Round produced an
agreement governing the use of various product standards, an
agreement which will tend to minimize the inappropriate use of
product standards as a non-tariff barrier.
I want to turn now to a brief overview of the characteristics and
rules of GATT. The GATT has little to say concerning the explicit
regulation of exports. Indeed, four or five years ago, when there
was a great deal of concern about shortages in the world, rising oil
prices, and rising commodity prices generally, commentators em-
phasized the problem of export controls and the need for interna-
tional regulations that would assure access to supplies and materi-
als in the world. At that time there was talk that GATT would
need to be amended. Such an amending, however, was troublesome
at best; indeed, one of the reasons that the Tokyo Round used a
series of side agreements instead of amendments to GATT itself
was the difficulty of amending GATT. So, largely these ideas of
amending GATT faded away as the economic climate of the world
"I See Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12
J.L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 21 (1980).
*2 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 1, at 56
(Supp. 26 1978-1979). See also Barcelo, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties, and Antidump-
ing After the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257 (1980).
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also changed.
Nevertheless, GATT does apply to export measures of govern-
ments. For example, the "Most Favored Nation" clause of GATT,
designed to assure nondiscriminatory application toward all GATT
members by any other GATT member, also applies to export con-
trol.2 If a government uses an export control in a way to disfavor
one GATT member as compared to another, that is a violation of
its "Most Favored Nation" obligation under GATT. Furthermore,
article XI of GATT directly prohibits the use of quota-type restric-
tions on either imports or exports. This limitation is often forgot-
ten because we have a practice that has been flourishing in recent
years called voluntary export restraints (VER's).24 These controls,
often implemented by an exporting country at the invitation of an
importing country, are used extensively, for example, by Japan and
to some extent by Europe, to try to ameliorate problems in their
export markets that they fear might lead to more severe restric-
tions. Technically, most of these VER's are a violation of GATT.
The trouble with enforcing GATT rules against them is that a
complainant cannot be found, for the exporter is not likely to com-
plain. The importing country also does not want to complain, be-
cause the VER's are exactly what they wanted. Third parties, at
least in most instances, do not have sufficient interest.
Other regulations in GATT which apply to exports include bal-
ance of payment measures, which are technical articles of GATT
that deal with the way custom agencies go about administering the
laws of the country2 5 and the obligation to publish regulations.2 6 In
addition, there are a couple of critical provisions in GATT which
deal with exports concerning subsidies and antidumping mea-
sures.27 There are positive obligations in the GATT against the use
of subsidies for the purpose of exports which previously were rela-
tively weak, but they have been strengthened by the subsidies code
in the Tokyo Round. On the other hand, there is no express prohi-
bition against dumping in the GATT or in any other international
agreement of any prominence. Instead, the importing nation is al-
lowed a special exception from other obligations to apply an-
" See GATT, supra note 1, art. I.
24 See, e.g., Measures on Passenger Car Exports to the United States Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry, reprinted in U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 76 at A-1 (May
6, 1981).
"6 See GATT, supra note 1, arts. VII-X. See also WORLD TRADE, supra note 13, at 439-77.
" See GATT, supra note 1, at art. X.
27 Id. arts. VI, XVI.
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tidumping duties in those cases in which a foreign party is export-
ing dumped goods.
The import obligations of GATT are considerably more exten-
sive. You must remember that our exports are other countries' im-
ports. So, to a considerable extent, GATT import regulations are
also critical for exporters. If you are an exporter or are advising an
exporter, what you will be principally worried about in most cases
will be the question of the import regulation of your target market.
On this issue GATT is very extensive indeed. First of all, GATT
controls tariff bindings, by which countries have obligated them-
selves to charge no more than certain specified levels of tariffs on
identified products in their tariff schedules. There are six or eight
volumes of tariff schedules appended to the GATT.2 8 Almost every
country in GATT has a tariff schedule; the United States tariff
schedule, for example, is a volume in itself 2 9 The schedules are
elaborate lists of goods with tariff amounts specified, and a country
is obligated not to charge more than that specified maximum
amount under the GATT agreement. Those are the tariff bindings
that have been negotiated so laboriously through seven interna-
tional trade negotiating rounds.
Now, beyond the tariff bindings are a series of other obligations
designed to reinforce tariff obligations. "Most Favored Nation"
status, which I have already mentioned, 0 is a central pillar of non-
discrimination policy among countries. An obligation for national
treatment exists which says that a government that is importing
shall treat the imports the same as it treats its domestic products,
at least after those goods have passed the customs border. As to
state sales taxes, for instance, the importing nation is not permit-
ted to charge a higher sales tax on imported goods than on domes-
tic goods. GATT also does not permit, for example, a more strin-
gent health care standard for pharmaceuticals that are imported
than for those that are produced domestically. Various groups try
to design regulations domestically that will, in effect, tend to in-
hibit the sales of competing imports, and there is a constant series
of cases in GATT and in diplomacy that have to deal with this
effort.
Beyond "Most Favored Nation" regulations are a series of other
18 1-4 CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GENEVA
(1979) PROTOCOL (1979).
:9 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982).
SO See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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previously mentioned detailed regulations about the administra-
tion of customs which apply to both imports and exports. These
regulations include obligations against the use of quantitative re-
strictions and soft regulations designed to handle the use of state
trading monopolies by countries.
An increasingly important aspect of GATT is the rules regarding
so-called unfair trade, but I must add that there are also a number
of exceptions in this area.31 Waivers that are granted by vote of the
contracting parties for example, are excepted from the rules, and
there are further exceptions such as the escape clause that time
will not permit me to discuss.
Let me turn to my second major topic, the question of unfair
trade measures. I cannot go into them all. I simply want to say,
though, by way of starting, that this is the area of the most discus-
sion in the political arena today and in recent years. One con-
stantly hears talk about how we must stop unfair imports. The
Congress has indulged in a great deal of this rhetoric, as have the
executive branch and private officials. There is both a saluatory
and a not so saluatory aspect about this discussion. The saluatory
aspect is something that can be described as the policy of the
"level playing field," which is the notion that societies or econo-
mies in an increasingly interdependent world should have a trading
system that allows the private firms, the merchants, to compete
fairly and on an even level with each other. Thus, if a foreign gov-
ernment subsidizes the goods of one of its firms, it is intervening or
interfering with the market process and distorting the market pro-
cess. That intervention is unfair because, as an American manufac-
turer will say, we can compete against X steel company abroad,
but we cannot compete against the chancellor of the exchequer
abroad. So, this notion of equal competition, which has long been
established in international trade law and policy still exists. There
were elements of a fair competition system in the last century, and
it has been developed and made more intricate. Equal market com-
petition was established in GATT at the time it was drafted and
further elaborated on in the Tokyo Round. The Tokyo Round it-
self has been codified into United States law by the 1979 Trade
Agreements Act, 32 which incorporates much of the language of
SI See GATT, supra note 1, at arts. XIV, XX, XXI..
n Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 95 Stat. 144 (1979). For the history
of the implementation of the Tokyo Round, see S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,
1-2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 387-88.
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both the Countervailing Duty Code and the Antidumping Code
written in the Tokyo Round.
We are beginning to realize, however, that although a number of
government and nongovernment people talk about the need to re-
strain unfair imports, in fact what they are really after is protec-
tion from competition. They talk about unfair imports to try to
design measures that overreach and effectively limit the amount of
imports. There are a number of specifics with regard to unfair
trade that can be dealt with, but time will not permit too much
discussion. Let me, therefore, just raise a couple of issues. It is dif-
ficult to determine exactly what is unfair; it is hard to decide how
far to go in calling imported goods the result of unfair actions
abroad. When you have an interdependent world, you have in-
creasing tensions that result from differences in economics. The
United States economy, for example, obviously differs from the So-
viet economy. That fact is easy to see, and we have some special
means and special laws that deal with that problem. Even rela-
tively similar economies such as the United States and France, or
the European Community generally, or the United States and Ja-
pan, have sufficient differences in their structures to cause stresses
and strains in our trading relationships. The degree to which other
governments intervene in at least certain sectors of their markets
is substantial, and it differs in that respect from that of the United
States.
Furthermore, the mere structure of an industry, for instance the
debt/equity ratio of an industry, or the degree of worker tenure of
an industry, can exacerbate trading problems that occur, particu-
larly in times of slack demand. Economists talk in terms of margi-
nal cost pricing, meaning that for a firm it is always useful in times
of slack demand to continue to produce and sell at any price over
its marginal cost, not necessarily its average cost. The firm's fixed
costs, such as interest on debt, other fixed costs, and in some coun-
tries worker tenure costs, will be paid anyway; therefore, in a slack
demand period, if a firm can sell at anything over its marginal or
nonfixed costs, it can gain. It is going to hurt for some years, but
presumably over the average of a business cycle the firm will come
out ahead. If other countries have economic structures which have
higher fixed costs, as is likely the case in Japan, which has higher
debt/equity ratios and higher worker tenure measures, then they
have lower marginal costs. Those countries have a competitive ad-
vantage in times of slack demand. There are some aspects of un-
fairness relative to that unfair advantage, but the system was prob-
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ably not at all designed with the notion of creating trouble in the
international market. The advantage is an unintended consequence
of the inherent differences between economic systems. Thus, we
must be careful about the degree to which we design rules in re-
sponse to unfair trade that overshoot the mark. Such rules do not
appropriately allocate a balance between the competing goals of
allowing governments freedom to implement policy for their own
societal reasons and not allowing them to foist on other undue bur-
dens, even at various times in the economic cycle."3
I now want to talk briefly about the implementation of rules of
GATT and the problem of dispute settlement. I have mentioned
the constitutional problems of GATT and how GATT is really not
designed to be an organization. Yet, the ingenuity of the diplomats
and some of the leaders of GATT over some thirty or forty years
has led to a variety of institutional devices to try to make it more
effective. At the core of this effort is the dispute settlement pro-
cess. We have two articles in GATT, articles XXII and XXIII,
which deal with dispute settlement, providing sort of a shadow
framework, particularly in article XXIII.
Basically, article XXIII says that a country can complain against
another country if it deems that the benefits it expected under the
GATT are being nullified or impaired by that country. Unfortu-
nately, the complaint is not necessarily tied to a breach of obliga-
tion but to nullification or impairment, which is roughly translated
as being an injury. Through the years GATT has developed a fairly
elaborate process of dispute settlement. First, a complaint is ta-
bled, and then the monthly council meeting appoints a panel of
neutral third parties. Mostly the members of the panels are gov-
ernment officials located at and accredited to GATT, but from
countries that are not parties to the dispute. The panel listens to
the disputants' arguments, both oral and written, and then it
makes its findings. Those findings, then, are reported back to the
council of GATT, and the council can decide whether to approve
them, merely note them, or take other action, as the case may be., 4
In the last several years, a problem has arisen from the increas-
ing number of disputes. The United States has instigated more dis-
33 Jackson, United States Policy Regarding Disruptive Imports from State Trading
Countries or Government-Owned Enterprises with Particular Focus on Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties, in INTERFACE ONE (D. Wallace, G. Spina, R. Rawson eds. 1980).
" See GATT, supra note 1, at arts. XXII-XXIII. For a review of this dispute resolution
procedure, see Hertzberg and McGill, Conflict Resolution, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 277,
300-04 (1980-81).
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putes, because it has become United States policy during the last
decade to utilize fully the mechanism of GATT; indeed, there are
legislative provisions, particularly in the Trade Agreements Act of
1979,11 under which the United States must go to the GATT
processes in a number of complaint situations. So for that and
other reasons, since the United States is certainly not alone in us-
ing the GATT mechanisms, there are a larger number of disputes
raised before GATT panels.
Several of the reported findings of these panels have troubled
some of the disputants. One of the reported findings was against
the United States in the case on the Domestic International Sales
Corporation (DISC). The United States finally decided it would
comply with the decision, but the case had been going on for more
than ten years.36 Other more recent cases have been the so-called
"Pasta" case3 and the "Wheat Flour" case. 8 In those two cases,
great troubles have arisen, and considerable questions of compli-
ance remain. As one student author recently said: "The GATT is a
morass of complexity and ambiguity. Few understand it, and even
fewer know how to apply it."'39
GATT has also been critized as being impotent to enforce sanc-
tions.40 The processes of GATT must be designed so that the sys-
tem as a whole can be more effective. A lot of attention was given
during the Tokyo Round and the 1982 ministerial meetings to this
problem, but the results are not entirely satisfactory. This subject,
therefore, remains on the table.
Let me end my remarks with a few general thoughts. We have a
3' The Act, for example, implements agreements negotiated in the Tokyo Round. 19
U.S.C. § 2503 (1982).
3 The United States response to the DISC dispute, which was initiated by the European
Economic Commission before GATT in 1972, was a flurry of bills to replace DISC with
"Foreign Sales Corporations". See, e.g., S. 1804, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 4741,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See also Administration Drafts Blueprint for Bill to be Intro-
duced as Replacement for DISC, 19 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 14, at 501 (July 12,
1983).
", The text of the settlement may be found in GATT Pasta Panel Report on U.S. Section
301 Complaint Against European Community Subsidies, 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No.
12, at 468 (June 22, 1983).
" The text of the settlement may be found in GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S.
Complaint Concerning EC Subsidies to Wheat Farmers, 18 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA)
No. 22, at 899 (Mar. 8, 1983).
" See Note, United States - Japan Trade Relations: Meeting the Japanese Challenge,
10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 157, 167 (1984).
40 Id. at 167. While the language of this author is somewhat overstated, he has docu-
mented relevant authority.
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series of critical international trade issues and an institutional
mechanism that has coped reasonably well in the past with these
issues. International trade experts increasingly worry, however,
that GATT is not well designed for the issues which will arise in
the next couple of decades; indeed, they believe, it may not be well
designed for the current situation and the tensions which have
arisen. We have a number of areas in which GATT simply does not
provide international discipline, and a number of areas exist where
there are loopholes in GATT. While new mechanisms of protec-
tion, new systems, and new schemes have been created to deal With
some new problems, some nations have abused the unfair trade
rules in ways that create processes that are expensive and labori-
ous in themselves.
Governments obviously are going to have to consult and attempt
to improve the GATT institutions. There has been increasing talk
in the last year, for example, about the need for a new trade
round. 1 Such statements have been made both by United States
Government officials and now by European Community officials. I
think there is more than a fifty percent probability that we will see
a new trade round, an eighth trade round, launched in the next
year or two, perhaps after the United States 1984 elections. Once
the trade round is announced it usually takes several years to gear
up for it and then from four to six years for its completion. So,
radical change in GATT is not something that is going to come
overnight. Nevertheless, I strongly support and endorse these en-
deavors, for we have much unfinished business. We see many
problems, as discussed here, that are out there festering, and there
is work to do that I hope we can get on with. Thank you.
4 Address by Mr. Dunkel, Director-General of GATT, meeting of the European Atlantic
Group, in London (Feb. 1984) (unpublished); EC Prepared for New Round of GATT Nego-
tiations, 846 EUROMARKET NEWS (CCH), at 2 (Apr. 4, 1985) (outlines goals of the EC for the
new GATT round including a halt to United States protectionist trends).
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